Professor: Dr. Sabatino DiBernardo
click here to email him
Some use the following phenomena as evidence for afterlife survival:
ESP: extrasensory perception
OBE: out-of-body experiences
Autoscopic: obe’s of this world
Transcendental: obe’s of some other world or realm.
NDE: near-death experiences: declared clinically dead yet survived. An important point to keep in mind is that
these people didn’t die (death is the final termination of life).
Arts of Dying: Since the experience of one’s dying is a human experience (note: one’s death is a limit condition
and by definition outside of our experience), the art of dying—ars moriendi—has been pursued throughout the ages
by different religious traditions in order to allow humans to prepare for and “conduct” death.
Christian: a public sacrament that allowed the dying person to tie up loose ends and put temporal matters in
order and “celebrate” this rite of passage with the family. Its focus was on clearing one’s conscience in
preparation for entrance into the next life.
Buddhist: Tibetan Buddhism focused on a transfer of consciousness (not conscience). The importance was not on the
state of the soul but the control of the mind and one’s last thoughts prior to death.
Comments:
These are just some notes to provide an overview of some central themes in the chapter. Make sure you read the entire
chapter, since you will be responsible for it. As you can see, there is a lot of material.
Things to do:
Complete the readings for the week :-)
Aloha,
Tino
Tino >> just trying to switch gears a little bit I just finished my online chat for my Spiritual Ideal course
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> SO feel your pain - rushed home from job 1 myself
Tino >> I'm going to leave for a moment to check the other chattrooms and make sure no one went there be right back
okay well let me welcome you all to religious quest and human dilemma is this a first online course for anyone?
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> yes
COLIN PETERSON>> yes
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Hello, first time caller, long time listener
Tino >> okay, so I'll just go over some basic online info stuff this week let me begin by saying that these chats are
optional this is a change for mefor three years now they have been mandatory as mandatory as one can make them they
were to be the online version of my F2F lectures however, what I found was that they didn't quite compare to their
F2F counterpart what I mean by that is this in my "live" courses I don't lecture in the traditional sense (I don't
do much in the traditional sense, as you will see by this course and the material covered) it was basically a
question format and through the questions we covered the material however, given the limited time constraints in
these online chatsa there, btw, is the first of many typographical errors, since my typing skills are pathetic and
I have to actually look at my keyboard while I'm typing furiously that will happen quite frequently I propose that
we ignore each other's mistakes in that regard otherwise we will spend the entire time apologizing and correcting
ourselves rather than discussing now, unless the typo is so blatant that deriving some meaning is impossible or
difficult we will just let those slide (for you as well) : ) anyway, given the time constraints I found myself
actually lecturing the material, which didn't leave much time for discussionskinda like what will happen in today's
chat by necessity so, I've decided to make these optional since many would just log on and "wander off" thereby
not contributing to the conversation but sort of satifying the mandatory requirement to "be here" so, they are
optional and they will be used as a question forum for you after reading the material I hope this will help us
engage in questions about the readings and carry on a good conversation the "lecture" component will be in the
form of the lecture notes so there is no reason to do that twice also the postings will be another way to continue
the conversation of course, that doesn't mean that if you can't attent the chats that you are left on your own
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> I hope I'm not interrupting, but . . . when we get to substantive chatting, is there a way to save
it or refer back somehow?
Tino >> we can also discuss the material or your quesitons via course mail students have cut and paste in the past
students have cut and paste in the past but that is something that I allow students to do if they so desire
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> That's what I'm doing right now
Tino >> that is not something that can be easily done at my end these chats are coded when they are saved okay, so you
can e-mail me or you can set up a F2F appointment and come see me in Cocoa, if you wish you can also use these
chats as an online office hour you may come and ask your question and leave if you have to however, if you do that
I do ask that you use the pvt msg function which we will now learn how to use click on the name of the person below
yours to the right of your screen and say hi. you will notice Private Msg pops up on the main screen that means
that no one but the person you have opvt messaged will see what you wrote now respond to the person who texted you
make sure to unhighlight their name to get back to the main screen otherwise you will continue to write to them
rather than to the rest of us any questions about that function?
KELLY KRINKS>> its all good..i just learned how to do this in hus other online class
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> it works
Tino >> You can also use this during the chat if you want to ask me something that you don't want others to see or for
clarification of something the only problem is if a bunch of you are doing this at once : ) then, it's kinda like
walking up to the instructor during a live class and wispering in her/his ear it might get to be a bit much wow,
another typo ah well . . . okay, so far so good?
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> 10-4
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> so far so good
KELLY KRINKS>> yep
Tino >> cool, a brief overview of the material we will start of with a very traditional approach to religion in the first
book in order to give yuo some basics in the area if you don't already have some so we will cover indiginous,
eastern and western religious traditions and these will focus on the problem of death as the limit condition for
life so, how people view and value death will give us a glimpse into their belieffs, rituals, etc. that comprise
their religious quest facing the ultimate human dilemma death in the next two books we will rethink the definition
of religion what it eans to be religious and how that can have practical implications for our contemporary society
in which secularization is an increasing phenomena any idea what secularization is?
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> The division of a religion within that religion. ???
Tino >> I think you are thinking about sectarianism
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> the opposite of making things sacred – more mundane?
Tino >> good Eleanor
KELLY KRINKS>> nonreligious
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> Lynn, please
Tino >> secular is typically juxtaposed and contrasted with sacred okay sacred and holy are synonymous that is above or
beyond the mundane (i.e., ordinary or natural world) secular, profane are typically associated so, when I speak of
a profane religiosity in the notes or a secular religiosity I'm not talking about swearing in church : ) that would
be just wrong the word profane like many of our words carry meanings that have been dissociated from their
etymological (i.e., linguistic origins) roots profane comes from the Latin pro fanum which means outside of or in
front of the temple and it was used to distinguish between activity that was done in a holy place versus natural,
daily acitivities thus, what we will find in the next two books are a rethinking of religion that falls outside of
the traditional "temples" of religion or as Caputo will say, a religion without religion as I told my previous class
this does not mean that they want to do away with or find meaningless traditional world religions obviously, they
still have meaning for a large segment of the human populatioin however, with an increasingly secular or worldly
culture in which traditional religion no longer finds its place at the center of their lives there are other options
out there and that is what this course will be exploring the religious quest and human dilemma in contemporary
cultureokay, just some pointers on the first chapter and then I'll take any questions you might havemake sure that
you have a good understanding of the various forms of trans proposed by Chidester ancenstral, experiential, cultural
and mythic these will be found in each tradition however, some traditions emphasize one or more over the others he
gives a good brief description of how death has been studied by scholars of religion over the past couple of
centuries and the theories that tried to locate death as the origin of religion as we will continue to see in this
course trying to find the origin (conclusively) of anything is a very problematic endeavor however, that does not
mean that we cannot make the claim that death is important to religion indeed, he has constructed this entire book
around the concept of the various forms of death he notes that humans may be defined as biological, psychological,
sociological, and religious and along with each of these ways fo defining the human there is a corresponding form of
death and transso ancentral connects living and dead through a biological chain experiential is a way of
"experiencing" or eradicating the fear of death in this life cultural is associated with the sociological issues
involved in any death and the collective memory of a society or culture in response to death for example, the death
of Lady Di or Lennon or Elvis and the mythic element is the story element word of warning here myth in the academic
study of religion does not mean a false story it comes from the Greek mythos which just meant story it did not have
the evaluative dimension of "false" appended to it that is yet another "modern" transformation of that word we will
use it as a meaningful story of just like the myth of capitalism (ie, as the "best or most valuable" political
system in the world) is, itself, a meaningful but non-provable story that many people live their lives by make
sense thus far?
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> yes
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> yes
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> sure
Tino >> okay, cognitive and forensic cognitive should be associated with memory thus, one has cognitive continuity in a
religious system if after death one's identity is traced by means of memory of one's life and a continuation of that
life based on that memory other religious traditions ephasize forensic (or legal) continuity where memory isn't the
important factor but, rather, responsibility for one's actions is for example, karma one cannot remember one's past
life in traditional Hindu thinking but is responsible for it insofar as one's next incarnation is a direct result of
itso, those are the two types of continuity, and you will see these in each of the traditions in this book finally,
I want you to focus on the four main types of afterlife survivial and the arguments against them disembodied spirit
spiritual embodiment reincarnation and resurrection there are some subtle differences here, and I want to make sure
that if you have questions about those that you ask them and we can discuss them the two "materialistic" theories
against any afterlife survivial are epiphenominalism and materialism both dealwith mind as a function of brain
activity these two are very close except that one is more radical than the other they both maintain that with the
death of the brain comes the death of thought or the mind thus there is no survival after that ordinary language
theorists aregue that we can't even conceive of bodies without physical embodiment since all of our language with
respect to cognitive processes (e.g., knowing) are dealt with in terms of bodily expressions such as I "see" your
point and, most of you will probably be familiar with ESP, OBE, and NDE theories of afterlife evidence so, go over
that as wellthe point here is not to convince any of you one way or the other this book's approach is historical you
will encounter many different kinds of beliefs including arguments for and against afterlife survival just make sure
you understand them as they are presented in the reading if you don't get it, or unclear (quite possible given the
subtely) please feel free to ask either in the chats or through e-mail okay, now my fingers are really tired so,
I'll turn the mic over to you and ask if there are any questions I'm assuming that most of you probably haven't had
a chance to read much of this material yet but future chats will assume that the readings have been done that way we
can just discuss your questions (or mine of you) so, any questions? if not, welcome again to the course.
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Nope, I'm good.
Tino >> and I'm sure we will be ahving some great discussions
COLIN PETERSON>> yeah, sounds like its going to be a great course
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Actually I do have a question.
Tino >> shoot
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Are we going to be talking about the questions posted in the discussion area, or is that just
strictly for the discussion area?
Tino >> good question if you would like to talk about those during chats feel free to bring them up those are meant to
be another avenue to carry on a conversation for the students I will, typically, not comment on those but I will
use them as a guide to direct the chats in other words, based on what is said in there
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> ok, sounds good to me.
Tino >> I can structure the questions to address certain perspectives that come up in the discussion forum also, it was
another way to gain an easy 100 points for the student
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> thanks :)
Tino >> so, it's all good : ) no problem if there are no other questions have a great night and I hope you enjoy the
reading
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> This wasn't as bad as I thought it was going to be. Bye.
Tino >> cool
COLIN PETERSON>> later
Tino >> glad to hear it, ciao
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> night, all
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> until next week...
Tino >> see ya.
Death: As in many primal traditions, in Australian religion death begins as a mistake in the Dreamtime. While
the stories differ regarding the primary actors involved, the element of “it could have been otherwise” with
respect to death is common.
Initiation for those capable of spiritual progress typically meant males. Women did not have spiritual power or authority
in these communities. Both genders, however, were believed to have originated in the Dreamtime.
Shamans: those who understood the mysteries of the Dreamtime. They played an important role in a culture that speculated
about premature deaths and attributed them to evil intervention (e.g., another clan). The two main questions
regarding premature death were causation and retribution (i.e., how? and why?). Voodoo deaths were the result of
countersorcery and a desire for revenge.
Death Rituals and Their Functions:
Along with these rites of passage came rites of crisis that tried to heal the rupture caused by the death within one’s
clan and avenge the death caused by sorcery.
Based on their strong totemic association (totem being a symbol for the clan) and belief in the Dreamtime, Australian
traditions would be considered cultural and ancestral forms of transcendence.
African Ancestors:
If the common feature of Australian religions is the Dreamtime, for many African traditions ancestors play the central
role (remember, even though Australian traditions include ancestor worship, it is a matter of emphasis).
Death:
Two reasons given for the existence of death:
One role of the ancestors was to serve as mediators between the divine and human realms in order to assist in
communication.
Although ancestors chose biological reproduction and death to personal immortality, they were believed to be present
in the community memory as well as biologically (they were believed to enter into the semen and thus be reborn
into the family).
As ancestors aided the community so, too, did the descendants serve the ancestors through setting aside certain food,
cattle, etc. in remembrance of them.
Thus, ancestral transcendence was the central mode for African traditions.
In African traditions afterlife judgment was based on individual and collective deeds committed during life. One of the
death rituals in the Zulu tradition required the mourners to reverse their ordinary behaviors, language, dress,
etc. In death, the dead lived a mirror existence (a reversed existence) of normal life. Depending on one’s deeds,
reincarnation and partial reincarnation were possibilities.
American Spirits:
The Australians have their Dreamtime, Africans have their ancestors, and Native Americans can be said to have nature as
the central or controlling metaphor for transcendence. We must keep in mind that these are only emphases and not
mutually exclusive forms of religiosity.
Native Americans have a reverence for nature, believing that all things including humans are part of nature. Shamans were
also important in this tradition. They were the ones in the culture who had direct access to the spiritual realm
located in the sky or beyond the horizon.
Depending upon the main activities of the group (i.e., hunting or agriculture), the rituals of the Native Americans would
emphasize different elements of nature. The agricultural Pueblo Indians, for example, would call upon the kachinas,
or the rain spirits, called through rituals to intervene between humans and the god(desse)s. Humans at death could
become part of the kachinas.
In the hunting cultures of the Huron, Ojibway, and Iroquois dreams played a central role. In the Ojibway, for instance,
the manitou was a spirit guide that would aid the hunter.
The dead traveled to the place where the “other-than-human persons” dwelt in the Land of the Dead. Thought was still
possible after death but communication was somewhat difficult. In fact, the myth of the Skeleton-Woman, among
others, shows signs of the ambivalence with which the Ojibway faced death and the spirits of the dead.
Death Rituals:
Some Indian tribes (e.g., Algonkian, Huron and Iroquois) celebrated a Feast of the Dead. According to Robert Hertz,
this feast showed:
“ that death could be understood as a gradual process in which the journey of the soul to the world of the dead was
synchronized with the decomposition of the body” and showed “social ties by burying all of the bones of the
community’s dead in one place” (67).
Regarding the afterlife, the Hopi recognized a form of forensic continuity.
In summary, all of the forms of transcendence may be located in the Indigenous traditions. However, the most central
form seems to be ancestral transcendence. Nevertheless, as Chidester states in the final paragraph of the
chapter:
“Whether or not the dead actually ended up in the places described by the myths can remain an open question . . .
If nothing else these myths demonstrated the power of the human imagination to invest death with meaning . . .
myths of death both reflected and shaped a way of life . . .” (72).
Things to do:
Make sure you read through the many myths in this chapter; they may show up somewhere again . . . hint, hint.
If you need clarification on anything encountered in the readings (remember, the notes are just an outline guide),
come to the chats! Prepare for the first quiz.
Talk to you soon,
Dr D
Tino >> hi folks just got out of my other chat
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> hello
Tino >> I'll be right back for your questions I just want to check something
ILANA GRIMES>> hello
Tino >> I'm back, okay, the quiz for last week and this week is posted you will be able to access it after
9:00 tonight
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> What format will it be?
Tino >> and you can take it anytime between then and Sunday at 6:00 (it closes at 6:00) multiple choice there are
20 questions each worth 2 points it will cover the intro chs1-2
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> we have five quizzes this semester right?
Tino >> correct all that info should be on the syllabus so, we are covering indigenous trans tonight I'm here to answer
any questions you might have about the reading but let me start by explaining that this book is an historical
descriptive approach to religious traditions and it is intended as a review of the various world religions in order
to show the different perspectives and the similarities between the various religions before we begin thinking more
philosophically about the religious quest and what that might mean for contemporary folks so, just wanted to let
you know that this one would be more informational in content and tone than the other books, which will cause you
to think critically okay, how about we start with any questions you have about this week's readings okay, we
started slowly in the chat I just had
ILANA GRIMES>> I am a little confused on the term transcend vertically in the African tradition
Tino >> so this will give my fingers a break while you're gathering your thoughts : ) what part specifically about
African trans which is the central mode of trans for them anyone can answer this btw
ILANA GRIMES>> The reading stated the ancestors allowed human beings to transcend vertically in 3 levels of reality...
dead, living and supernatural.. is this the main African link to the underworld?
Tino >> that is like the various forms of reality that we find in many traditions we have something like that in our
own Western perspective in terms of ghosts that reamin dead yet "around" in some other reality that isn't a
movement on to some other form of reality for example, heaven hell so the various states of reality correspond to
the state of the person who has died another state we might want to add to that is the liminal state (liminal here
means boundary) of the shaman how would we classify the shaman's state of reality?
ILANA GRIMES>> The shaman is the link btw the "living dead" to humans on earth?
Tino >> correct
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> a shaman travels between states of being
Tino >> and since I want you all to a have a good understanding of the various forms of trans what type of trans does
the shaman represent yes other thoughts
ILANA GRIMES>> supernatural
Tino >> remember my first question? nope
ILANA GRIMES>> no
Tino >> what are the four types of trans? from the chapter on religion, death and dying look it up if you have your
books : )
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> ancestral, experiential which the shaman would be cultural and mythic
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> ancestral, experiential, cultural, and mythic
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> ancestral, experiential, cultural, mythic - a shaman could be all 4
Tino >> okay on the first part yes but the shaman gets to become the shaman based on emphasizing one of those four
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> mythic - but I'm guessing
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> experiential
Tino >> good try but mythic is the story part we tell myths about the afterlife, yes
ILANA GRIMES>> mythic b/c a shaman maps the world of the dead
Tino >> Christopher, it is experiential
ILANA GRIMES>> oh
Tino >> because the shaman "experiences" death and comes back to life this is part of where that verticality comes into
play he is in that liminal state of living yet dead yet living and becomes a link to the supernatural realm indeed,
if the shaman tells stories and maps out the next life
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> isn’t it more lateral than vertical though?
Tino >> this is a type of mythic trans well, it is as is stated in the text on 57 both vertical and horizontal in the
context of the book we find that the dead ancestors and that is the word I was looking for earlier ancestral trans
is the emphasis in African trans not that the other forms aren't present we've just given a few examples but
Chidester's point is that while all forms may be present some emphasize one or more over the others so, for African
it is ancestral the ancestors play a major role in their religious traditions and the ancestors are the links
between the lif of the living and the supernatural reality based on their status as dead ancestors that is the
vertical part the horizontal part is where they are still "present" in the community and, indeed, even in the
semen to be passed on throughout generations so, it a biological form of ancestral trans that's kinda why I
brought up ghosts they have both a vertical and horizontal dimension however, the analogy fails in a way since
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> its extra dimensional somewhat
Tino >> we condiser that preternatural rather than supernatural and that's where som confusion might enter into the
equation yes, Robert, But, of course, that depends on the theology of ghosts and that depends on the culture
talking about the ghosts and the difference between embodied and disembodied spirits, etc. good question
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> the shamans use dmt in south america to visit that dimension and see the bright shining faces which
some construe as a near death experience
Tino >> yes, what we will find in this book is different myths and different emphases on trans but if you take a step
back you may also find some interesting similarities in the various approaches to death and even phenomena that are
spoken about in the West such as OBE's and NDE's, very good, other questions or points of clarification? keep in
mind since this is not a philosophical text my typical Socratic method is not going to be employed to the extent
of critically analyzing each experience since a. we would have to have the experience to better understand it
b. this is simply an overview of the various beliefs/rituals of a very broad range of religions we could not
possbily do justice to each of them anyway, other questions? notice what they seem to have in common about death
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> is it too late to post to the first reflection question
Tino >> actually, no
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> sweet
Tino >> since the quiz does not start until 9:00 after that it will be
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> ok, so do it now
Tino >> cool
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> thanks
Tino >> any thoughts about what these various forms of religion have in common regarding death
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> They all seem to have an explanation for it
ILANA GRIMES>> ancestral transcendence
Tino >> yes, that's where the mythic element comes in, yes, that too Ilana, indeed
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> lots of folks have found some pretty complicated ways of dealing :) and so far none of them say
that's it, you're just dead
Tino >> at least not in these traditions very good and I do want to direct your attention to p 72 Chidester notes that
he is not really concerned with the question of whether or not these people actually go to whatever places they have
desginated in their myths this can remain an open question as he says but he does want to direct our attention to
"the power of the human imagination to invest death with meaning" in the process of investing death with meaning
they both reflect and shape our way of life so, studying these various forms of trans will give us some insight
into the values of the people that hold them and how they have dealt with the issue of death and its meaning we
can also continue to ask the question about how we in contemporary culture deal with death do we deny as Becker
noted do we fetishize it do we ignore it do we continue to buy into supernaturalistic explanations do we make it
the ultimate limit condition dead and done?
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> yes
Tino >> all of these approaches may be found but we must remember that whatever approach one takes it has implications
for one's life that's why the study of death is actually a study of life and ways of being in the world okay, any
other questions about this chapter?
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Not me
Tino >> I'll give you a few minutes to think before we log off if you don't have any you're free to leave
ILANA GRIMES>> thank you
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> this is a bunch of historical info - how do we prioritize what to focus on and remember?
Tino >> yeah, good question the lecture notes point out some of the more significant general stuff but if you are
asking for the quiz bascially, you need to do highlight the basic orienations and then go back for specific
myths I don't expect you to remember each story, etc however, that is why you have the book and it is timed so,
if one has read the material they'll know where to go for the answers if not, that might be a bit tough
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> one will make sure they have :)
Tino >> also, the next book will contain much less of this kind of info : ) lol good anything else?
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Nope, thanks.
Tino >> btw, if you have any techincal problems with WebCT, and it's been known to happen don't freak out just
e-mail me and I'll find a way to make it all better : ) do remember to save your answers after every question
and to hit submit once you are done I will be sent a copy of each quiz after it has been submitted along with
the times, etc so, any issues with the quiz will should be able to be sorted out my hope is that there are none
but, we know how that goes
CARLOS LANTES>> hi tino, your posted question on life and death (#2), is it to be referenced to primal religion or
current?
Tino >> either is fine with me okay, if there are no other questions then have a great night
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> thanks, you too, Dr D
ILANA GRIMES>> thanks , you too
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> Thank you.
KARLA COCO>> tks
Tino >> ciao
Around 1500 BCE a group known as the Aryas moved into India and developed a rich religious tradition that included the Vedas (the sacred scriptures of what
would become Hinduism) and the socio-religious caste system. This caste system consisted of priests, warriors, merchants and laborers (excluded from
full participation in Vedic religion)
Two goals of Vedic religion: to maintain social, hierarchical order and to gain liberation from it. Death was always regarded as evil; although it could be
transcended.
Focus on these key terms in this section:
Purusa, dharma, moksa, karma, sraddhas, Agni, pinda, loka, soma, Brahman, atman, samsara, Arjuna, Krsna, Visnu, bhakti
Approximately 600 BCE saw the creation of the Hindu sacred texts known as the Upanisads, which promised a liberating knowledge (shifting the emphasis from “salvation” through ritual actions). That liberation from death occurs through the knowledge is the realization that atman is brahman. The self is one with the power behind the universe, the brahman. This process required discerning between reality and illusion. This form of transcendence became known as Vedanta Hinduism due to its occurrence both literally and philosophically “after the Vedas,” which was oriented toward ritual sacrifice rather than self awareness. In this new mode of Hinduism one’s life became the true ritual sacrifice through knowledge, discipline and renunciation of the world.
The ultimate goal in liberation was to achieve freedom from death and rebirth regardless of the form of Hinduism. Other texts within Hinduism told of liberation through the way of devotional love (e.g., the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, Bhagavad Gita) of God. The liberation found in the Gita was an alternate form (i.e., other than vedic ritual or Upanisadic knowledge) through devotion to the divine in personal form (viz., Krsna) one could obtain salvific grace. Thus, liberation became salvation.
This non-vedic tradition (much like Christianity arose out Judaism, Buddhism arose out Hinduism) originated in the 6th c. BCE and was founded by Siddhartha Gautama (part of the warrior caste). The Buddha (enlightened one) rejected vedic ritual as well as the Hindu notion of liberation through knowledge that atman is brahman. Although the Buddha maintained the Hindu doctrines of reincarnation, karma, samsara and liberation, he denied the existence of a permanent essence or self (i.e. atman). This denial led to the Buddhist doctrine of anatman (or nonself). This was not a recognition that the self is Brahman but, rather, an extinguishing of all desires and attachments to the world and the self through meditation. A person is no consistent thing but a product of causes in the process of constant change. There is neither personal immortality of soul nor personal extinction after death for those who have reached enlightenment (all others are reincarnated).
One of the changes that occurred in this form of Buddhism was the application of merits from those who achieved enlightenment to those ordinary folks for whom
the strict life of meditation was not possible. The goal here was to gain a better rebirth in the next life. Another change was that the Buddha became viewed as
divine (along with this came relics, shrines, and many other ritualistic elements that had been denied by the Buddha). Much like the notion of saving grace in
certain forms of Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism began to promote dependence on the saving grace of those that had achieved enlightenment. Thus, merit and
dependence on grace became the hallmarks of Mahayana Buddhism (even though according to the Buddha we are to work out our own salvation).
Focus on these key terms in this section: nirvana, Mara, anicca, dukkha, anatta, stupas, bodhisattvas
Ancestor worship was a prominent dimension of ancient Chinese religion. Confucius developed a ritualistic, ethical philosophy that was devoted to living a life
of harmony. This harmonious life was grounded in positive and negative forces (yang and yin, respectively). Positive and negative forces come together during life
and disperse at death. Taoism also developed during this time based on the work of Lao-tzu (viz., the Tao-te Ching). It, too, was grounded in harmony—the
natural way or path of the universe—the tao.
Propriety is the central principle for an harmonious life. This includes both ethical and ritual behavior. Reciprocity is also crucial in Confucian thought. Thus, proper
behavior begins with familial relations and extends throughout the entire society. Improper relations means disharmony, which, in turn, means unstable life and
society. Moreover, Confucius would not speculate about the gods, because, as he noted, we still are unable to understand how to deal with human matters.
Elements of ancient Japanese traditions: contact with spirit world, deification of humans after death, and filial piety. When Buddhism entered into Japan from
China, syncretism (taking elements from various religious traditions) came to represent Japanese religion. It is not uncommon for Japanese to “belong” to more
than one religious tradition; or, better yet, in Japan one moves freely from Confucianism to Taoism to Buddhism.
In 18th century Japan, Zen Buddhism developed as a way to enlightenment (satori) in Rinzai Zen and Soto Zen. Central to Zen enlightenment is the realization that
nirvana is already present in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth. In other words, only when one does not want nirvana and does not fear or despise death can true
enlightenment occur.
Focus on these key terms in this section: hun, p’o, T’ien, , shen, kuei, tsu, li, ch’i, wu-wei, kami, Bushido, Shoji, zazen, Seppuku, hara-kiri, syncretism.
Tino >> okay, we're going to be talking a bit about Asian trans. did you note the various differences within each tradition that would actually make some
closer to others of another tradition e.g. Theravada Buddhism versus Mahayana Buddhism? One thing I would like you to get from these readings
is an appreciation for what Caputo will talk about later as the non-existence of religion or Christianity or Buddhism or Hinduism etc. What do you think
he might mean by something that sounds so counter-intuitive any ideas? feel free to throw them out there : ) nothing?
ILANA GRIMES>> non-existence of communal devotion?
Tino >> no just focus on the last part of that the non-existence of "religion"
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> their similarities as the truer religion?
ILANA GRIMES>> movement towards individual religions?
Tino >> or "Christianity" or "Buddhism" okay, let's start there what do you mean by movement towards individual religions and how does this deal with differences
within each religion eg. Mahayana versus Theravada Buddhism let me help you out
ILANA GRIMES>> lost me sorry
Tino >> Is there such a thing as Buddhism?
ILANA GRIMES>> yes
Tino >> what is it
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> a religion
Tino >> what is religion good keep going
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> its different with avery person
Tino >> if it is different with every person
ROBERT BRUSSOW>> sprituality is different religion is the same
Tino >> then how can one define it for everyone? and is Buddhism different for every person ' if it is then the question much like the question about religion
does not allow for an answer (for all) re: what "is" religion or any of the supposed religions in other words for Caputo, as we will see, but I want you
to begin seeing it this way through your own readings in Chidester's book there is no singular thing that we can point to and say this "is" what Buddhism
is since for example you have very contrary ways of belief within the religion itself so, Theravada Buddhism does not allow for salvation through the
"merits" of others it is an individualistic philosophy/religion of enlightenment and no one can do it for you so the Buddha says you are to "save" yourself
which means find your own enlightenment and yet Mahayana Buddhism finds slavation through "grace" (Chrisitian language here) through the merits of
others which means that I don't have to find my own salvation or enlightenment
KARLA COCO>> is it kind of like trying to define what the words "this" or "that" as Wittenstein pointed out...children just seem to learn how the words are
used in context. Same goes for religion- perhaps it is defined through embodied actors
Tino >> I can depend on the help of others to provide me with their earned grace through their enlightenment indeed, the problem is that because we use the
words from birth it would seem it appears as though there is something represented by the word through its constant usage without ever being questioned,
and if we begin to question it in terms of what "is" _____ we start to encounter our inability to define in any definite way ( from de fine or the end or
final word)
KARLA COCO>> right
Tino >> that which we are trying to define so, from an historical perspective what we are seeing here is various religious developments within their own religions
and we will see this in Abrahamic traditions as well so, in some cases one religion develops out of another so, just as Christianity developed out of Judaism
and was not a "separate" religion in the beginning so, too Buddhism "splits off" (as if there were some hierarchy that it could split off from) from Hinduism
and there are thus similarities and differences between the various traditions but it becomes even more difficult to "pin down" what any religion " is"
(i.e., what it takes to be considered apart of the tradition in other words what they "believe" or their rituals etc) when they differ within their own traditions
so, let me give you another example Hinduism was highly ritualistic in its inception then it began to emphasize not salvation through ritual but rather through
a liberating knowledge that Atman = Brahman. like devotion to the saints in Roman Catholicism sort of we have to be careful with making such comparisons
but it suffices to note that development of theological or religious teachings occur in all the religions so, when one is talking about Hinduism the logical
question would be which form of Hinduism and the same question cuold be asked of Buddhism and Christinaity as well does this make sense?
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> yes
ILANA GRIMES>> yes
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Yes
Tino >> okay, so it is in this sense that Caputo states that there is no such thing as Buddhism or Christianity or Hinduism, as if we have some single unified
"thing" that is Judaism let us say rather we have many Judaisms now when this is broadened to the question of religion the same problem confronts us,
what "is" religion? attempts to reduce all those "things" that we just spoke about to one element and typically if you are from the West that thing is a belief
in God well, in the case of Theravada Buddhism there is no personal god and therefore it is atheistic in Confucianism what we have is a highly ethical
ritualistic system that deals with questions of proper behavior so, if the standard is belief in God those two "religions" don't qualify so, if you get this, then
you will understand why there is also no single "thing" called religion rather there are many possible ways of life that fall under the category of what we
might consider religious and trying to find the "one thing" that makes them all religious is difficult if not impossible thus, recent scholars have begun using
functional definitions of religions asking questions about function if something functions in a way similar to the functioning of traditional religions then it would
appear to be religious of course, this, as we will see, broadens the scope of religion way out there okay, anyway this is what I would like you to keep in
mind it is not simply that scholars who have "lost faith" are trying to redefine religion to meet their own needs which (of course may still be the case) but
rather that there are historical reasons for the difficulties that they have encountered in trying to make such strict determinations or delineations with respect
to religion make sense thus far?
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> Yes
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> yes
ILANA GRIMES>> yes
Tino >> great, then I think you will be more than prepared for the next two books. Okay, are there any questions that you have about the readings for this
week?
ILANA GRIMES>> I think you covered them
Tino >> okay, others? I'll give you a few minutes to look over the book or your notes. Did the readings make sense to you? This book is pretty straight
forward
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> It was pretty straight forward
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> yes
Tino >> : ) okay, well
ILANA GRIMES>> if in the Japanese culture, they belong to more than one religious tradition, where do they find "salvation"?
Tino >> since we will have plenty of time to deal with stuff that isn't so easy, good question remember, much of Chinese trans is about harmony much more than
"salvation: which is a Western term
ILANA GRIMES>> yes
Tino >> salvation requires that we are saved from something and for something thus, it implies a theology of "fallen from grace"and we must be saved from the
consequences of that fall well, as we saw in Native American traditions there is more emphasis on peace and harmony with a good world not a fallen one
and since those traditions such as Confucianism are more about proper conduct in this world not because of punishment in some sense of Hell but
because that is the proper way of functioning in this world problems occur when there is no order chaos results and that starts with the family
ILANA GRIMES>> so having harmony is not a path to salvation but enlightenment?
Tino >> so, one can focus on Confucianism for those wise teachings well, enlightenment is a Hindu/Buddhist notion so it isn't even that it is more this worldly
functioning than anything else now
ILANA GRIMES>> ok
Tino >> that doesn't mean that they don't have other elementas
ILANA GRIMES>> that makes sense
Tino >> but that is where the other traditions come in and that's why they don't have to be card carrying Confusianists at the expense of other wise ways of
bringing them harmony and peace in this world so, in Taoism for example one will gain harmony and peace when one's personal tao (i.e., way or path)
is in line with the universal Tao (way or path) Confucius didn't speculate about the gods or the next life because, as he noted, we don't even know what's
going on in this life let alone the next we think singularly about religion in the West because of our historical context one in which ethnicity and geography
went hand in hand with religion religion is a cultural thing as much as it is a matter of ritual and belief and we've seen this historically in religious politics an
entire country is convereted when it is conquered by another make sense?
ILANA GRIMES>> yes
Tino >> good question
ELEANOR HUNTZINGER>> getting there
Tino >> okay if there are no other questions you are free to leave
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> I have a questions about the last test, should I ask it here or email you about it?
Tino >> if you're still thinking those intrested can hang out. Okay folks, well if there's nothing Else, I will bid you all farewell until we "meet" again
CHRISTOPHER COCHRAN>> next week then...
KARLA COCO>> ah yes
ILANA GRIMES>> thanks
Tino >> : ) ciao
KARLA COCO>> good lecture
Tino >> thanks
JEANETTE SANCHEZ>> everyone have a good weekend
Tino >> it was fun, bye
Key Points:
Judaism, Christianity and Islam are referred to as Abrahamic traditions due to their lineage going back to Abraham, Sarah and their son Isaac (whom God asked Abraham to sacrifice;
Abraham faithfully obeyed but was stopped by God before the death blow).
Regardless of the tradition, they are linked to Abraham (or Ibrahim) as a beneficiary of the promises from God (Yahweh/Allah).
Many of the beliefs and ritual actions associated with the Abrahamic religions can be traced to earlier ancient Near Eastern cultures such as Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Persian.
Afterlife judgment was part of Egyptian religion (as in all three Abrahamic traditions at some point). Mesopotamian religion did not have an afterlife judgment; rather, after death
all people would exist in a shadowy state in the underworld (also in early Hebraic religion--Judaism). Zoroastrian religion (Persia) developed both an individual judgment
after death and a collective and final judgment at the end of time (which became a feature of Christian religion). However, it differed from all three (except some sects of
Christianity) in terms of a final universal salvation for all.
Note: concentrate on the various myths of Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Persian religions. This will be very useful for matters of comparison with the Abrahamic religions
(as well as for the quiz!).
Some features of Jewish religion:
Afterlife: in ancient Jewish religion the deceased were consigned to a shadowy life in the underworld; in later Jewish religion a more complex notion of judgment and bodily
resurrection developed. However, not all later Jews believed in some afterlife resurrection: Sadducees did not believe in resurrection, while the Pharisees did. Bodily
resurrection in Jewish and Christian traditions was different from the soul/body dualism of the ancient Greeks and Romans (specifically, the Platonic notion).
Humans were not thought to be immortal but, rather, a combination of earthly material and the spirit/breath of Yahweh.
Transcendence: ancestral transcendence was of primary importance (the biological continuation of one’s life). One lived on through one’s offspring. That’s why Abraham was
promised many descendants and not personal, physical immortality, which was a very rare thing in ancient Jewish religion).
Regarding apocalyptic visions (unveiling), although these bizarre tales of future cataclysmic events are often interpreted literally (our contemporary period is no different), it is
quite possible, and in some cases even probable, that the earlier listeners of these “prophecies” understood them as symbolic. The job of the prophet, in fact, was not
to predict the future but, rather, to call the people back to God and God’s way of doing things.
Death and resurrection of the body was central to early Christianity. The paradigm or model for this doctrine was the death and resurrection of Jesus. Christians, too, could be
saved from death by devotion to the savior.
Early Christianity was viewed as a sect of Judaism. The struggle for religious identity is documented in the Acts of the Apostles. It started out as a small group of followers of the
Christ (which came to be known as the Way). Under emperor Constantine and, then, Theodosius (381 CE), Christianity became recognized as the state religion and later
the only official religion allowed within the Roman Empire.
In the eschaton (or “in the end”—last things, final, ultimate, etc.), Jesus would come to judge the living and the dead. So, Jesus the savior also becomes Jesus the judge.
Note: focus on the disparity of attitudes toward death between Socrates and Jesus. Also, think about Chidester’s comment regarding what Jesus as an ancient Hebrew would
have believed about death.
The resurrection stories about Jesus are useful in demonstrating early Christian concerns with what a resurrected body would be like (p. 172).
Death according to St. Paul was an enemy and the result of the primordial sin of Adam and Eve. Death is an enemy to be conquered.
The book of Revelations is the Apocalypse (i.e., revelation or unveiling) of John. As was noted in the section on Jewish apocalyptic tradition, John continues the literary tradition
of imagery and symbolism for this book. Of course, this has been the cause of much confusion regarding the meaning of the Apocalypse. One thing to keep in mind is
that the revelations are directed to various Christian communities in existence at the time of the writing of the book. Consequently, contemporary readers who view these
writings as meant for some future time (usually, their own) in which cataclysmic events will occur must be reminded that they are not the original audience. Indeed, it seems
as though St. Paul, Jesus and others expected an imminent end. When this did not occur, the goals and mission of the early Christian church had to be rethought. Martyrdom
became one way of gaining instant salvation, in the minds of many early Christians, during periods of persecution.
Islam was developed after the revelations to Muhammad (570-632 CE) and the recording of them in the Qur’an (or Koran). The main goal of Islam is submission to the will of Allah
(islam means submission). The central creed of Islam is: “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is Prophet.” This creed is one of the five pillars of Islam, which also
include prayer, charitable giving, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca.
In the Qur’an Allah is credited with being the omnipotent (all-powerful) creator. He has total power over life, death, and resurrection. An interesting twist in the doctrines of death and
resurrection is the notion of death as sleep. Indeed, in order to show Allah’s ultimate control over every aspect of life, it is noted that Allah removes one’s soul during sleep
only to restore it again when one awakens. Thus, the separation of body and soul is a prominent feature of Islamic thought. Moreover, death is not to be feared, since it occurs
nightly. Sleep in this sense, then, is a rehearsal for death. In the dream state the living could be in contact with the dead, receiving messages in the form of dreams or visions.
After death angels visited the deceased and asked questions of them, known as the “trial of the grave.” A taste (and/or an experience) of the torment to come would follow a failure in
the questioning and a taste of (and/or experience) of paradise to come would follow successful questioning. The garden of paradise in the recreation of the world after the
resurrection was described in very sensuous terms. Men could expect the accompaniment of women in this afterlife garden (very patriarchal perspective). Those who had
rejected Allah during life would receive eternal punishment without recourse in the next life.
Sufi mystics (an esoteric—i.e., reserved for the few—group) concentrated on the unity of God and the experience of union between one’s soul and Allah. This experience removed the
desire for heaven and the fear of hell for the mystic. The only thing that mattered was the desire to be one with God in a bond of love. These mystics had much in common with
mystically oriented religions such as Buddhism in terms of meditative practices (but not necessarily in terms of the goals of meditation). This form of Islam engaged in an
experiential transcendence of death.
The Abrahamic traditions share a common origin in the Abraham story and, thus, the monotheistic God referred to as Yahweh or Allah. The significance of this theological issue in
current political struggles should not be lost on us. We are dealing with conflicts between cultures that pray to the “same” God, each claiming divine mandate for their political
and militaristic actions.
Also, myths and beliefs about the afterlife were influenced by religions that came before the Abrahamic traditions. Parallels may be found in the various religious traditions. And as is
the case with most beliefs, development over the centuries brought about theological changes. Thus, it is very misleading to talk about Judaism, Christianity or Islam in the
singular as if they are static, universally constant systems. In this sense, then, there is no such thing as Judaism, Christianity, or Islam but, rather, Judaisms, Christianities,
and Islams (in other words, many versions of each, none of which by itself constitutes the entirety of the tradition).
Now, it starts to get a bit abstract and theoretical. Chidester’s work set the stage for organized, institutional religion and the various human dilemmas
encountered in the world religions. He also set the stage for a broader understanding of religion--defining religion(s) as a humanizing activity and
experiments in being human.
In Brockelman’s book, we take the next step in trying to understand the phenomenon of religion and its place in contemporary culture.
He begins by asking a number of questions to inform the reader of his goals:
1. What is an interpretation?
2. How does one decide whether an interpretation is correct or ‘true’?
3. What kind of truth are we dealing with in religion?
4. How do we evaluate contradictory truths within one’s tradition and between different religions?
5. What do we mean by religious understanding and truth?
These are some of the questions with which Brockelman will be wrestling throughout the book. If you have ever asked the question “how do I know
what I believe is true?” then it will be important to plod your way through Brockelman (it may get difficult at times, but hang in there and ask
questions as they arise!). This week’s chat will deal with these (and other) questions explicitly.
This book came about as a way to discuss religious renewal (i.e., making religion vital and important again in the lives of those who identify with
traditional religions). In the process, Brockelman found that in order to discuss renewal, he had to answer a number of other questions that
led to the need for renewal in the first place.
The best way, perhaps, to assist you in this week’s readings (and subsequent readings in Brockelman) is to define some of the terms he uses consistently
throughout the book in order to make the process of translation a bit easier. So, following are some shorthand definitions that should allow you
to get through the readings with much less discomfort and, it is hoped, a better understanding (since ‘understanding’ is what this book is all about)
of the material at hand.
Shorthand translations:
Hermeneutics: a branch of philosophy that studies human understanding and interpretation; when you see this word, think interpretation or
understanding.
Epistemology: a branch of philosophy that studies human knowledge; the central question is “how do we know what we know?” When you
see this word, think knowledge; thus, an epistemological problem or dilemma asks the question “how do you know?”
Myth: from the Greek muthos, which means story or something said; it doesn’t mean false; it is a story that provides meaning and value; it is
shaped by and simultaneously shapes one’s perspective on reality.
Worldview: it is the way one experiences and views reality. One worldview (e.g., the ancient) allows for many different myths. Thus, a
worldview is more encompassing than a myth. It should be noted that there are some gray areas in trying to distinguish between the two
(matters of definition, as usual). For the sake of a common language, we will follow this distinction for the most part. According to Brockelman,
it is “culture’s overarching and encompassing sense of meaning, purpose and essential point of human living” (p. 30). As you can see, this is very
similar to myth. See p. 30.
Modernism: is a way of viewing the world with science and technology as the guiding forces. The period of modernity began in the 17th
century (with the Enlightenment) and is represented by some of the following characteristics: objectivity, functionality, scientific experimentation
and observation (i.e., empiricism), verifiability and falsifiability (part of scientific methodology); a displacement of theological, spiritual or
metaphysical questions in favor of trying to understand and manipulate our earthly surroundings. See pp. 30-37 for Brockelman’s analysis of
modernity.
Postmodernism: if scholars disagree about dates and emphases regarding modernism (and they do), positions on postmodernism are even more
diverse and contentious. In other words, there is no consensus regarding what postmodernism is, since, by definition, it is simply that which comes
after modernism. That said, for our purposes, postmodernism represents a move away from the knowledge, certainty, and objectivity that marked
modernism without giving up entirely on science and technology. Thus, postmodernism grows out of (and thus is influenced by) modernism but levels
serious criticisms about its usefulness and presuppositions about the world for contemporary existence. Some of the philosophical characteristics of
postmodernism include relativism, uncertainty, aesthetic aims over functional or pragmatic aims, difference (of all sorts) rather than similarity, and, for
many, a move away from logic and reason to human experience in its many forms. Postmodernism is a critical stance toward the truths proposed by
modernism. For Lyotard, postmodernism is defined as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” This question will be central to our ongoing discussion of
the role of stories (i.e., narratives) especially in postmodern culture.
As Brockelman notes, all historical events (including purported religious events) are not objective events that require no interpretation. Indeed, all events, acts,
etc. require meaning to be ascribed to them. The meaning of anything (e.g., a flower) is not objective. The existence of the flower may be for our
purposes objective but not its meaning (if any). The same seems to be the case with events. What all events require is a narration of the event (i.e.,
what happened) and the meaning behind the event (e.g., the why, the goal or purpose and end). While agreement on the fact that an event occurred
is relatively objective, the interpretation of the reasons and/or meanings behind the event is filtered through subjective stories, myths, worldviews, etc.
Subjectivity is not verifiable and, thus, not objectivity. In other words, we could all agree relatively easily that there appear to be words in front of us
on the computer screen (objectivity); but the significance, meaning, and truth of these words are highly interpretive and, thus, based on our own social,
historical, cultural, philosophical and religious backgrounds (i.e., biases, preconceived notions, etc.). This interpretive context and filtering process imposes
meaning on “raw” events and affects how we view things. Another example of this is the automobile accident that everyone agrees occurred but, then,
differs as to the meaning or reasons behind the accident. This would be an example of objectivity and subjectivity at work.
Brockelman maintains that it is this interpretive context (i.e., hermeneutic) that accompanies all stories, including religious stories. Religious stories are not
objectively verifiable like those that are subject to scientific experimentation; so, the question regarding the kind of truth represented by religious
truth is raised. Is it similar to scientific truth? Or is it a different kind of truth that requires different criteria for truth?
This brings us to the human dilemma as Brockelman envisions it.
We live in a period in which the traditional religions and their truths have been questioned based on our “modern” scientific worldview. This has led to what
Brockelman refers to as the “twin specters of meaninglessness and fanaticism” (p. 3). With the deconstruction of truth, our contemporary religious
options have been limited to the twin horns of the human dilemma where one either retreats into fanatical absolutism (where Truth is proclaimed
unquestioningly) or one goes to the other extreme where there is no Truth (i.e., nihilism) and, thus, any “truths” that in which we might believe are
relative. He notes that postmodernism and its critique of truth opens up a third and more viable option for people searching for meaning; namely, a
narrative or story approach to religious understanding and truth that doesn’t require absolutes or exclusivism (i.e., there is only one Truth; our Truth!
Everyone else is wrong). Stories provide meaning and truth without having to succumb to the scientific notions of objective truth. To think otherwise is
to imply that all peoples prior to the advent of modernism were deceived and/or lived meaningless or false lives. Our spiritual ailments can be healed if
we recognize the various myths within which we live (including the myths of scientific progress, capitalism, modernism, etc.) as myths. Once we recognize
these mythic structures and worldviews, we will be in better shape to live myths that we find meaningful rather than having our own inherited unconscious
myths live us (in other words, living a story without ever questioning or thinking about it in some reflective manner).
Brockelman’s thesis:
“religious knowledge involves two kinds (or aspects) of narrative understanding: (1) the narrative disclosure in myth, historical revelation, metaphysical
system of possible modes of meaningful existence, and (2) faith or the actual living out of a particular story or personal identity in light of that
disclosure.” (p. 17)
Key Points:
A Postmodern Story About Human Understanding
Brockelman has told the story of the historical movement from myth to modernity in the first chapter. Now, he continues the narrative by explaining the
postmodern story about human understanding. If you were unclear about postmodernism (pomo, for short) in the last chapter, Brockelman gives
an in-depth analysis of some of the central themes associated with pomo.
Rather than retell the story, I will outline some central ideas and direct your attention to key passages in the chapter that should provide the sensibility
that Brockelman is trying to establish regarding our pomo culture.
1. Modernity reduced knowledge to matters of fact and reason.
2. The modern worldview, however, is not itself a matter of fact or reason. In other words, it is not “true” but simply a bias or prejudice regarding
what is valuable.
3. This modern bias toward fact and objectivity is an attempt to overcome personal, subjective prejudice and opinion. It is a desire for certainty and
objectivity. But this desire (this prejudice) is, itself, the product of a bias against bias (prejudice). It is not based on fact. It is a belief about
what is or is not meaningful.
4. This is where foundationalism (p. 53; make sure you know the definition of this term—it may prove useful in the future! hint, hint) comes in. The
claim that knowledge needs to be limited to facts/reason is, itself, a nonfactual claim.
"Foundationalism: is any theory in epistemology (typically, theories of justification, but also of knowledge)
that holds that beliefs are justified (known, etc.) based on what are called basic beliefs (also commonly
called foundational beliefs). Basic beliefs are beliefs that give justificatory support to other beliefs,
and more derivative beliefs are based on those more basic beliefs. The basic beliefs are said to be self-justifying
or self-evident, that is, they are justified, although not justified by other beliefs. Typically and historically,
foundationalists have held that basic beliefs are justified by mental events or states, such as experiences, that
do not constitute beliefs (these are called nondoxastic mental states)." (Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Foundationalism)
"Hence, generally, a foundationalist might offer the following theory of justification:
A belief is epistemically justified if and only if (1) it is a basic/foundational belief (i.e., it is justified
by a nonbelief), or (2) it is justified by a basic belief or beliefs, or (3) it is justified by a chain of beliefs
that is supported by a basic belief or beliefs, and on which all the others are ultimately based." (Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundationalism)
5. This can be told as a story. I would be remiss if I did not include my dissertation advisor’s quote in this section. James Wiggins has noted that “The plot
to end stories can now begin to be seen as the plot of the story to end all stories.” (p. 54)
6. Thus, understanding and interpretation are central to the human experience of anything. We accomplish this understanding through metaphors, symbols
and images (i.e., seeing something through or like another thing).
7. This process is involved in science as well: “the sciences themselves are now seen to be interpretive human projects or social constructs within the human
context or world of ordinary experience. Facts and hypotheses based upon them are theory- and value-laden. There can be no complete, objective
truth in this human life precisely because we—our minds, our bodies, and our sense of what is meaningful—are involved in whatever we come to
know.” (p. 55) If anyone has any questions about this (or anything else in this chapter), bring them up in the chats.
8. Does this mean that there is no such thing as truth? Even if there is no Truth (although there may be), this doesn’t mean there is no such thing as subjective,
relative truth (or meaning). Art, music, poetry, literature, film, etc. disclose truth and meaning. It is of a different order (and, perhaps, a more
meaningful order than “factual” or empirical truth).
Consequently, story (or narrative discourse) takes center stage in this chapter (as with the entire book). This brings religion, philosophy and mythology
together as interpretive narratives of meaning. As Brockelman notes:
“Our immediate interest here lies with the narrative or story mode of such disclosive truth, for such narrative understanding constitutes the primary vehicle for
the human perception of an overarching, interpretive disclosure of the meaning of being. In other words, religious stories or founding myths constitute
the means whereby human beings see life and human destiny as a meaningful whole, thereby constituting not only the variety of human worlds or
cultures, but the religious traditions and philosophical worldviews (such as modernity) which populate those cultures.” (p. 66)
A myth, then, is “a story which makes available an interpretive understanding of reality and human destiny . . . “ (p. 66)
9. The philosophical turn concerns the intention and goal of philosophy—wonder. Philosophy throughout Western history has been guided by the quest for and
discovery of Truth; however, in the Socratic tradition (not the later developed Platonic Socrates), philosophy concerned itself with the experience
of wonder that leads one to question without claiming knowledge about that which one is studying. That is what led Socrates to claim to know
only that he did not know (which may, itself, prove to be problematic). Thus, “wonder is in reality a state of being in which you ‘know you
don’t know’ . . . Wonder, then, is a stepping back from our immediate experience to notice aspects of it which until then were unnoticed because,
as we said, we are too busy living them through to reflectively notice them.” (pp. 68-69) Moreover, wonder “is a state of astonished amazement,
perplexity and curiosity aroused by the miraculous reality or actuality of life.” (p. 72)
10. Thus, we think about words and their representations, since “one doesn’t know in any final sense what various words, or in reality what various phenomena,
in our experience actually ‘mean.’” (p. 71).
The point, then, is that beginning with Socrates, and now in much of pomo philosophy, we are encouraged to live in or with the questions—not only to continue
to question but also to be content without final answers. Living in the question is to live in wonder.
11. One thing to keep in mind is that philosophers are no different than other human beings to the extent that they, too, find themselves situated within a culture
and have their own interpretation (i.e., hermeneutic) of existence or way of seeing the world. As Brockelman explains:
“philosophers are historically and culturally situated, and bring to their lives and activities (including developing a philosophical perspective) a tacit
understanding of what life is all about, a way of seeing life as a meaningful whole . . . Philosophies, in general, then are built upon a non- or
prephilosophical, personal interpretation (hermeneutic) of what is fundamental or most basically ‘real’ and significant about living.” (p. 74)
From this perspective, philosophies are another form of religion and/or mythology that is never absolute, objective or certain. This, however, is a move beyond
mere opinion to the extent that one takes responsibility for one’s thinking (even if, or because, it is not true in any absolute sense) and one’s
philosophizing.
Finally, according to Brockelman “postmodern philosophy throws us back on ourselves in that it provides no ultimate standpoint or certainty about what our
lives are all about. We find only perspectives and approaches, interpretations of meaning . . . Philosophy, then, shares the goal and purpose of
religious life in general—i.e., to help us live an awakened and responsible life as deeply and fully as possible.” (p. 79)
Welcome to the wonderful world of postmodernism. It is uncertain, subjective, relative and, for many, liberating. Although this uncertainty has often led to
insecurity, Brockelman believes that this is the place to begin regarding religious renewal in our contemporary period.
Key Points:
In this chapter Brockelman addresses religious knowledge in the light of hermeneutics (that interpretive process of understanding) and its relation to notions
of the self and identity. His main argument is that myths or stories are the result of a narrative understanding of the self. Existence is structured
narratively in the sense that we experience ourselves as active participants in our own and others’ stories.
The methodology used for this analysis is existential phenomenology. This methodology attempts “to reflectively lay out or describe various aspects
(phenomena) of our concrete experience (existence) from the point of view of the subject(s) or agent(s) involved.” (p. 84)
Existential phenomenology is the attempt to reflect upon, analyze and describe the ordinary world of experience that usually operates in the preconceptual
or preflective realm. How many of us ask about all of our experiences from waking to sleeping and everything in between? Typically we just
function in some route manner without ever thinking about the experiences (and their implications). It is an attempt to bring these daily experiences
to consciousness. It is a questioning of things that are not usually questioned. This process was applied by modernity to religious experience.
It has led to a labeling of this preflective experience as a sort of naiveté regarding belief. Ricoeur calls the questioning and then appropriating
this experience a “second naiveté.” As Brockelman explains it “(while maintaining a critical, reflective rigor) an attempt is made to interpretively
explore, articulate, and make available in contemporary terms the experiential and first naiveté so evident in the premodern or traditional
world.” (p. 86)
Two crucial points made about phenomenology:
1. “our experience of the world inevitably takes place in a linguistic and hermeneutic context.” (p. 87)
2. phenomenology is itself an interpretive endeavor without any sub specie aeternitatis or God’s-eye perspective.
And as Rorty notes, we can never escape the hermeneutic circle. What is the hermeneutic circle? One can only understand something based on an
understanding of the whole and the parts of which the whole is comprised. One can only understand what the parts mean by understanding the
whole of which it is a part. Consequently, one can only understand a practice in a given culture by understanding the culture as a whole, which
can only happen when one understands the practices that make up a culture. Understanding, then, bounces back and forth between parts and
wholes in an interpretive (hermeneutic) move that always operates within that circle.
Moreover, the primary mode of understanding is story. When one wants to know or understand another human being one does so through narrative: “tell
me about yourself” (in other words, tell me your story); or “what’s his/her story?”
According to Brockelman, the events engaged by humans require action (which comprises intentionality or volitionality, time, goals). The goals toward
which our actions strive provide the plot for the stories of our lives. Thus what we do names us, describes us and provides our meanings and
values.
This goal-oriented perspective provides a telos for our lives (i.e., the end or goal toward which on lives). Without some cohesive sense of an end what
one finds is a series of unrelated sequence of actions.
When we change our stories or plots, the story that had previously dominated one’s being is included in the new story as a subplot. For instance,
when one experiences a religious conversion the previous life is reinterpreted in terms of the postconversion story. Thus, according to
Brockelman, we not only have stories but we are stories (p. 94). We are unified diversities. The “I” is perceived as a unity even though
we are constantly changing over time in every way imaginable (physically, physiologically, cognitively, psychologically, etc.).
He notes: “Each of our lives . . . is aimed at an ultimate interpretation of the meaning of being (hermeneutic) which we strive to become and which
configures the series of temporal actions that characterize our ordinary experience into a meaningful plot or story” (p. 96). Religions function
similarly. They give us an ultimate aim or goal toward which we move and through which we interpret existence.
Brockelman begins this chapter with the tale of the “miraculous” birth of Siddartha Gautama and the dream (and interpretations of the dream) that
preceded it—not unlike the birth of Jesus.
He asks some crucial questions: namely, what do we do with stories of the miraculous or the supernatural in an age that has come to disbelieve them?
What epistemic weight, if any, do they carry? He also notes that once we get on that slippery slope of denial, it is very difficult if not impossible
to get off. If we are to do this, however, we have simply exchanged one worldview for another (in this case, the modern). He puts this in the
context, once again, of the twin specters of meaninglessness and fanaticism that he believes have infected contemporary culture (again, not all but
many).
Brockelman, however, believes that with postmodernism there is a third option. It is a form of “nonempirical, mythological and hermeneutical
understanding” (p. 100).
Using the birth story of Gautama, he notes that it expresses the significance of his birth to those for whom a transformation through his way of being has
occurred. It’s not the “facts” of the Buddha’s birth or that of Jesus that matter. What is important about these stories is that they say something
meaningful and valuable (i.e., truthful) about a certain way of living in the world.
As Brockelman explains, “religious traditions and cultures are not founded on ‘fact,’ but on different narratively expressed interpretations of what it means
to be . . . It is a hermeneutical and existential truth, then, a truth about how to genuinely and fully live life that such stories narratively make available
to us” (p. 101).
In this chapter you should focus on the ways in which Brockelman explains how stories help us to view life as meaningful.
His definition of narrative: “a temporal sequence of actions in which—like the notes in a melody—those actions are individually significant only in so far as
they are interrelated parts of a meaningful whole” (p. 102).
He references Roland Barthes to make the point that narrative is not limited to words and sentences. Indeed, any attempt at communication (intended
for others or not) is a narration.
Narrative is related to myth in that “myth in this context means the narrative disclosure of an interpretive understanding of what life is
about” (p. 103).
A world, in this sense, is “the horizon of human consciousness and oriented activity” (p. 105). That’s why we can speak of different peoples and cultures
inhabiting different worlds and having different worldviews. Each of these worldviews makes various mythologies and theologies possible.
Thus, “interpretive understanding is not so much a set of conceptual convictions (beliefs), then, as it is an attitude toward life which is behaved and
which structures a world of ordinary experience” (p. 105).
Stories provide identity, meaning and a way of being in the world. We find a story meaningful to the extent that we see ourselves as characters in the
narrative. Once we feel out of character, that’s a good sign that the story is beginning to fail for us.
This type of mythic or narrative understanding “is neither objective fact nor subjective illusion, but rather an interpretive display. It is an understanding
that is true to the degree that it evokes (speaks out), makes manifest, or uncovers and reveals an interpretation of life as a whole” (p. 109).
One of the questions that is being addressed in this chapter deals with the status of any story or text prior and during the act of interpretation. Brockelman
explains that the text itself requires an interpreter. It is only in the dialogical movement (or hermeneutic circle) between the text/story and the
interpreted that meaning arises. That encounter between reader and text is an interpretive environment. It is not simply discerning what is the
“there” in the text; rather, it is always a bringing-to-the text a certain way of seeing things that influences what one sees (or what one is capable
of seeing) in the text (see reception theory p. 112).
As he explains: “In the dialogical encounter of text and reader which is the act of interpretation, the reader responds to the text with both a set of conditions
(history, culture, language, gender, class) and an attitudinal set of glasses. Those glasses do not create the meaning of the text. Rather, they frame it
with significance so that it (or aspects of it unnoticed through other glasses) can be seen” (p. 113).
Since we are always already situated within our own subjective experience of existence, according to Hick and Brockelman, there can never be a single
objectively true interpretation (p. 116). The human condition precludes this possibility. From this perspective, then, experiences of God within the
myriad religious traditions may be true but not comprehensive, they may be true but not absolutely objective.
How does this interpretive way of being in the world relate to the spirituality? First, since humans necessarily communicate through story, it is a necessary
form or condition for human existence. Second, stories sustain us. Third, it is the very necessity of form and content (i.e., points 1 and 2 just mentioned)
that leads us to ask how we ought to live.
As Brockelman puts it, “In the widened sense of interpretive understanding, then, spiritual or religious understanding and truth are central to and unavoidable
in human life. The spiritual issue in human life in general is not whether to be spiritual (i.e., theism vs. atheism), but how to be spiritual, how to live
meaningfully and deeply.
It’s all a matter of story. Since the beginning of human consciousness, story has been the fundamental instrument and vehicle for communicating human insight
and meaning” (p. 117).
In this chapter Brockelman attempts to translate the theoretical into the practical; that is, to show how story, myth, narrative and existential hermeneutics
are related to living the interpretation not simply thinking or theorizing about the interpretative process.
This connection is made through faith. Now for many of you faith immediately brings to mind theology or traditional religion. However, for Brockelman this
term refers to any living out a meaningful story:
“Faith is nothing but the living of this existential story centered on a mythologically disclosed interpretive understanding of life ‘seen as’ a meaningful
whole” (p. 134).
This notion of faith is juxtaposed with reason (its modern alternative). Brockelman is quick to remind us that regardless of modernity’s proposal of life
lived according to reason, it, too, is grounded in faith (i.e., faith in reason) and not in reason. All of reason and science cannot establish the meaning
of existence. Reason and science are functional. They allow us to understand the physics of our world but not the metaphysics of our world. In other
words, meaning, value, goals, and purpose are engendered by belief narrated through story and lived out in faith.
As Brockelman explains:
“Faith is living in the light of an interpretive understanding of life made manifest narratively or mythologically. It is not primarily ‘belief’ about an
absent (transcendent) entity called God, not propositional assertions considered true or false in some matter-of-fact way, but a mode of
being, actively living out a personal story centered on such an interpretive understanding of what it means to be, a way of existing in the world . . .
Faith is a quality of living . . .” (p. 139).
Brockelman introduced us to the notion of postmodernity and the possibility of the religious quest given a contemporary version of the human dilemma
(twin specters as the result of the epistemological problem and our modern heritage). John Caputo provides another story of postmodernism
and attempts to show what a postmodern religiosity might look like.
Don’t let the traditional religious language mislead you. Caputo is a postmodern thinker who is trained in traditional Christian theology but does not confine
himself to traditional dogmatic claims. Indeed, he wants us to think about a religious possibility without religion. We will explore this throughout the
book (and in the chats).
Caputo begins his book with the, perhaps, surprising claim that the subject matter of religion does not exist. In other words religion does not exist; thus,
Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, etc. do not exist. What he means by this is that as singular entities they do not exist. There is no such
thing as a singular, unified Christianity or any other tradition. There are, more accurately, many Christianities, Buddhisms, Judaisms, Hinduisms
and religions.
He goes on to give a shorthand definition of religion as the love of God. But before you applaud or grimace (whatever your take on traditional religion and
God might be), Caputo presents an interesting twist on this notion; namely, he doesn’t know what it is that he loves when he loves God. This
forms the basis of the book and the primary question that he attempts to live with (not resolve or answer—as you will see, Caputo provides another
religious way of being in the world, one in which we live with the open-ended question in a nondogmatic way).
Religion is for lovers, he tells us. It is for people with a passion for life and love. So he will explore how this manifests itself. Notice, he does not believe that
the opposite of a religious person is a secular person (i.e., a “worldly” person who doesn’t believe in traditional religion). For Caputo religion is a
quality of being (much like with Brockelman) rather than a thing. It is adjectival rather than nominative. As he explains:
“I am out to waylay the usual distinction between religious and secular in the name of what I shall call the ‘post-secular’ or a ‘religion without religion.’
I include a lot of supposedly secular people in religion—this is one of my unorthodox tendencies . . .—
even as I think a lot of supposedly religious people should look around for another line of work. A lot of secular people love something madly,
while a lot of religious people love nothing more than getting their own way and bending others to their own will (‘in the name of God’)” (pp. 2-3).
Love, according to Caputo, is unconditional. He then plays with I John 4:7-8, 16 where we are told that God is love. If God is love then through linguistic
slippage and equating what comes before and after the copula “is” he notes that love is God. He muses, wonders about and questions this
relationship and its ramifications for contemporary understandings of religion. Part of what religion means for Caputo is that a covenant with
the impossible is engaged. Of course, as is the case with other questions, Caputo wrestles with the meaning of the impossible.
It will be important to take note of the religious description of Marx. This will give you an idea of how religion manifests itself in “irreligious” people.
After reading Brockelman and his notion of faith as living in the light of a story of meaning (and interpretation of what it means to be),
describing people who are against religion as religious might begin to make a bit more sense. As Caputo notes, “I think the distinction
between theism and atheism is a little more unstable than people think, including popes and bishops” (p. 17).
Central to Caputo’s philosophy here is ambiguity and uncertainty about the identity of self and God while experiencing a passion for the latter through/by love.
Rather than trying to find, uncover or disclose The Secret (which is what most religions and philosophies throughout history have attempted to do),
he wants us to confess that we don’t know The Secret. He is suggesting a learned or wise ignorance that leaves the Absolute an open question.
We must act, but we act in the constant absence of knowledge given our subjective perspectival existence (as Brockelman noted)—even if we think
we know. As he explains, “The secret, on my hypothesis, is that there is no Secret” (19).
I will leave you to reflect on one section of this first chapter (and I suggest you concentrate on pp. 20-24 after having read Brockelman).
“We have not, to my knowledge, been visited by some Super-Revelation, some Apocalyptic Unveiling, that settles all our questions. Nor have we,
I should add, come up with some Super-Method in philosophy or even science that will, so long as we follow It (The Method) rigorously, expose
the Essence or Hyper-essence of Reality, that will steer us through the stormy waves of becoming or cut through the veil of appearances.
We cannot, by science, philosophy, or religion, situate ourselves safely in some privileged spot above the mortal fray below having gained the
high ground of a Privileged Access to the Way Things Are, which distinguishes “us” (philosophers, physicists, true believers, etc.) from poor
beggars down there in quotidian life who wander about two headed and who do not know The Way. We all need a ‘way,’ I am not denying that,
but I deny that anyone has the authority to Capitalize their way. There is no way to know The Way, no way that I know, anyway.
By confessing up front that we do not know who we are, that we are cut off from The Secret, we find ourselves forced constantly to traffic in ‘interpretations,’
the inescapability of which is a good way to define ‘hermeneutics’ . . . I am not saying that there is no truth, but I am arguing that the best way to
think about truth is to call it the best interpretation that anybody has come up with yet while conceding that no one knows what is coming next” (pp. 20-21).
Well, for those of you that had difficulty getting through Brockelman’s work, Caputo’s chapter is a much more accessible reading of the issues with
which we are and have been dealing. Both are doing phenomenological analyses, but Caputo’s approach is less laden with jargon. However, his
approach is very postmodern in the sense that he offers a playful, ironic, reading of philosophy, theology, and intellectual history. Since the readings
in this chapter repeat themes we have addressed, I would like to direct your attention to a few areas that require emphasis.
Caputo begins by listing the great “masters of suspicion” Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and their attacks on premodern modes of thinking. They attacked religious
belief on the grounds of various sociological, psychological and historical criticisms.
Thus, modernity and the Enlightenment provided a new way of thinking that didn’t require the foundation of faith (however, as we saw in Brockelman and
now in Caputo, this is not the case). Reason, empiricism, and science became the rallying cries of these modern approaches to life.
In Caputo’s book, there is a suspicion of the suspicious, a questioning of the questioners, an “unmasking of the unmaskers.” What this means is that their
own criticism of religion, belief, faith, etc. have been turned against them. Thus, he calls for a new Enlightenment—a way of appropriating religion,
belief, and faith minus the innocence or naïveté that characterized their premodern counterparts. This, if you recall, is the distinction raised by
Brockelman as the secondary naïveté.
Caputo calls this the postsecular sensibility (“postmodern” in his eyes has become a hopelessly abused term). It is a move that incorporates into itself the
critical sense introduced by the masters of suspicion as well as a move beyond them insofar as it is critical of this ungrounded critique. In other
words, it recognizes that all forms of criticism that attempt to judge from some privileged perspective are doomed to fail based on their own
standard (that privileged perspective doesn’t seem to be able to be grounded).
Here are some of the names (and their theories/perspectives) with which you should be familiar:
In this week’s chapter we’re starting to catch a glimpse of what “impossibility” entails for Caputo with
relation to the shape of religion in postsecular culture. He begins by noting that it deals with
“reality beyond the real” (p. 67).
What does one new possible reality look like? Interestingly enough, it looks a lot like “virtual” reality.
It is a coming together of science and religion (much like the conflation of science and religion in a
mystico-religious manner in Star Wars) in that digitized space that both is and isn’t “somewhere.”
This cyberspace is a new “space” that actually doesn’t take up much “space” at all. It is this omnipresent,
yet invisible, “reality” (sounds a bit like the divine attributes of God) that allows us to travel instantly
to far-away places and transcend our own time and place.
Thus, according to Caputo, there is something religious going on in this very course even as we study religion
(which may require us to pause to reflect upon the distinction between studying religion and engaging in
religion, and what that means). If religion without religion represents the religious sensibility that
falls outside of traditional religious institutions, then, religion about religion might represent the use
of this transcendent realm of cyberspace, this hyper-reality, in order to “objectively” reflect upon, describe
and analyze the phenomenon of religion. It is in this sense that Caputo notes that our “tamper[ing] with
our sense of what is real” (p. 68) implicates this medium in a contemporary appropriation of religion and
the religious sensibility.
Consequently, far from the death of God as proclaimed by the masters of suspicion, religion in its traditional,
alternative and postsecular manifestations is alive and well on planet earth. Although the shape of
religion has changed and will continue to do so, the human as homo religiosus (recall Chidester) has not.
We will continue to act out our existential hermeneutics, our myths, our worldviews, our philosophies of
life, explicitly or implicitly, in such a way that meanings, identities and values are pursued and lived
through faith (recall Brockelman). Caputo’s point (and Brockelman’s) is that we are living in a period of
history in which a new techno-religious story is being told through our culture and our individual experiences
as beings within that culture. The only question that remains is whether or not we will be able to view this
changing story as a meaningful and sustaining religious story, given our (modern) biases regarding the split
between science and religion, fact and value, theism and atheism, and any other binarism you would like to
throw in that denies the ambiguous quality of existence.
If the first part of this chapter makes sense to you, then, the religion of Star Wars will not be a hard pill to
swallow. Religio-spiritual and techno-religious themes pervade this film. Beginning with one of the most
recognizable and identifiable catch phrases in movie history, “may the Force be with you,” our attention is
immediately directed toward the religious thrust of this sci-fi film as it parallels the Christian phrase,
“may the Lord be with you.” Also noting the religio-philosophical themes in The Matrix (a strong point that
needs to be made about the value of exploring popular culture—especially music and film—for its religious and
philosophical implications, which is something that I do in two other courses; viz., Religion and Spirituality
Through Popular Music and Religion and Philosophy Through Film—a shameless plug, I know J), Caputo seeks to
enlighten us to the religious dimension all around us that goes unnoticed in contemporary existence, because
we have not been trained to discern it in any meaningful fashion.
It is in this sense that Caputo states, “Religious transcendence is beginning to transcend the traditional religions”
(p. 90). Again, not that Caputo is attacking traditional religion—indeed, he goes out of his way to note
that this is not the case and that there is still much value in traditional religion for many (p. 89)—rather,
he wants to clear a new space (which includes cyberspace) for the impossible, the new possibility that is
represented by the new realities of existence.
As he explains:
“Still, I would say that something else is also astir outside the churches, that something is slipping beyond or
outside the boundaries of the traditional faiths, that a certain religion flourishes without these traditional
religions, a religion without religion, and that the sense of religious transcendence has begun to assume
new and other forms. These traditional faiths contain something that they cannot contain, and there is an
unmistakable tendency today to wrest religious phenomena free from religions, to reproduce the structure of
religion outside of the traditional faiths and outside the classic oppositions of religion and science, body
and soul, this world and the next” (p. 89).
Caputo is now ready to develop the notions of “impossibility” and “reality” as they relate to religion.
In the opening remarks of this chapter, he states succinctly the distinctions regarding reality with which
he is working.
Prior to modernity:
the world as presented through religious faith = the really realPostsecular world:>/b> In our postsecular or postmodern world, religion returns in the form of hyper-reality. As we
have already noted, this means a reality beyond the real. It is “impossible” in the sense that modernity
could not imagine this type of reality in that it had a very myopic or narrow-minded notion of reality or
the possible.
How is this religious? Well, as we saw in the last chapter, this hyper-reality disturbs our own sense of reality
in a way very similar to the religious (and ancient philosophical) disruption of reality by positing a reality
beyond the experientially real. Think of cyber-space and the many questions of reality that conjures up; or,
better yet, go rent The Matrix.
In this chapter, Caputo addresses something that is all-too-common in our current world, whatever reality you’re
living: viz., violence in the name of religion and its cause—religious intolerance. As he says, “A good part
of the problem with religion is religious people (without them religion’s record would be unblemished)” (p. 92);
a pretty harsh, if not accurate, indictment of religious people—not religion.
Notice that action (e.g., feeding and helping those in need) is central for Caputo’s view of religious people (not
what, if any, tradition they belong to). These are people that love the impossible. They do work that is
impossible work. Why is it impossible? It is impossible, because it will never come to an end or to
completion.
Next, comes the harsh attack on philosophers: “The philosophers, on the other hand, happen to be away that weekend,
staying in a nice hotel, reading unreadable papers on ‘the other’ at each other, which they pass off as their
way of serving the wretched of the earth. Then, after proclaiming the death of God, they jet back to their
tenured jobs, unless they happen to be on sabbatical leave and spending the year in Paris” (p. 92).
Ouch!
But, this is where it gets complicated. These lovers of the impossible (the religious) are often impossible people.
They brook no disagreement and confuse themselves with God.
This is why Caputo asks “what do I love when I love my God?” Religion “is our doing, not God’s, and we should avoid
confusing religion or ourselves with God” (p. 93). This is Caputo’s problem with fundamentalisms of all
sorts.
The central problem of fundamentalisms of “the book” is that they attribute to a “text” (see pp. 99-100 and its
relation to that word that Brockelman emphasized: Hermeneutics) some Absolute power, which cuts both ways.
The problem is the combination of an impossible passion for God with an impossible assumption of Absolute
truth that precludes this passion for God to be transferred to an unconditional love for human others.
Indeed, if it is extreme enough, it is the catalyst for the impossible situation in which we find ourselves:
endless violence and rage in the name of the love of God. Notice how the term “impossible” is also like a
two-edged sword. It can be used as an open-ended positive feeling or a closed-minded weapon in the service
of some Absolute (to which, it would seem, we have no access—the impossible).
Absolutism, from this perspective, is the result of settling on one’s interpretation as infallible (the domain of
God and not humans). And as Caputo notes, “Absent that admission, God and death-dealing, religion and
violence, will never be far apart” (p. 100).
The fear is directly related to the abyss, that open-ended notion of possibility (or impossibility as the case
may be) that does not settle our questions with absolute responses. As Caputo explains, “It is healthier and
less traumatic just to recognize the abyss and to recognize that we are all in this together” (p. 108).
Just some things to think about: Do you agree or disagree with Caputo? Is he being fair or unfair in his analysis?
How would you respond to his presentation of fundamentalism?
Well, you’ve done it. You’ve all made it to the end of the semester! Thanks for hangin’ in there through the
difficulties (technical and otherwise) encountered. Job well done.
This final chapter attempts tie it all together for Caputo. Interestingly, this chapter also has elements of
both Brockelman and Chidester. These elements, by the way, will help you in your final paper (viz.,
definitions of religion common to Chidester, Brockelman and Caputo).
One of Caputo’s contentions in this chapter is that human experience is fundamentally religious at its core.
To be human is to experience and, thus, to be religious. He reiterates that “true religion” is a quality
of being religious, which for him is open-ended rather than the “one true religion.” He asks his readers
to abandon literalistic, fundamentalistic assurances of Truth and Knowledge, since by definition this would
not be faith. Much like we cannot ask, “which is the one true language” (nonsensical question), “which is
the one true religion” is undecidable. Moreover, it is a problematic question at its core, since religion
is something that is done and lived rather than argued. Religion as a propositional system of beliefs pales
in comparison to lived religion.
As Caputo notes,
“The faithful need to concede that they do not cognitively know what they believe by faith in any epistemologically
rigorous way. While faith gives the faithful a way to view things, they are not lifted by the hook of faith
above the fray of conflicting points of view” (111).
For Caputo “love trumps knowledge.” That’s why religion is for lovers. The religion of which Caputo speaks, a
religion without religion, is religion as a virtue, a passion, a love that pervades our earthly experiences.
Thus, religion is a human activity/action, (an experiment in being human, as one of our authors has said).
Religious truth, then, requir