PHI3320
Philosophy of the Mind


Professor: Dr. Mason D. Cash
Click here for his website, or click here to email him

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Announcements:

To Clarify the due dates we talked about in class today:

Last short paper: due in class this Thursday (2nd)
Take home final: Distributed this Thursday (2nd). Due Thursday (9th)
Research papers: Due by next Monday (6th).
For papers and final exam: Get a paper copy to the philosophy dept. office by 5:00 pm.
Get an electronic copy of same to WebCT by 11:00 pm)

Any Bonus short papers should be done by the 9th. Submit like take-home final.

Reminder: by extending the due date, I am ensuring that I have a very short time to get
grading done. Any of you who want to get Research papers off your hands before the
weekend are strongly encouraged to do so.

Reminder: I'm still having office hours today and Thursday, and the same for next week.
If you have questions, requests for clarification, etc, please come and see me: 1:30 - 4:00 pm.
(Today I'll likely be in the bookstore cafe, grading, and I have a meeting at 4:00 so please
come before 4:00, leaving enough time to answer your questions before I have to go to this meeting.)

See you on Thursday.

Dr. Mason Cash
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Central Florida
Orlando, FL
USA 32816-1352

Here are my notes for this class. Scroll down to find the right date.

August 24, 2004 (Tuesday):

Just the typical introduction for the first day of class. Nothing special.

August 26, 2004 (Thursday):

August 26, 2004
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August 31, 2004 (Tuesday):

August 31, 2004
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September 2, 2004 (Thursday):

Class canceled due to Hurricane Francis.

September 7, 2004 (Tuesday):

Class canceled due to Hurricane Francis.

September 9, 2004 (Thursday):

September 9, 2004
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September 9, 2004
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September 9, 2004
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September 14, 2004 (Tuesday):

Malcolm is saying that only you can know what is in your mind because I can only know what is in my mind and not what is in other people's minds.

Ryle is a behaviorist. (can argue against this for a short paper topic)

Something happens to the body -> pain occurs in the head -> sends signals back to the body -> causes the body to flinch or wince, etc... You become a certain way. Our mental state is observable through our behavior.

Malcolm states = "If I have no criteriea for coreectness, then I have no certainty of what is in my mind."

The criteria for using any term correctly, must have something external or physical to compare with.

Words are labels for public entities. Words can't label things in our minds.

Pain is labled through similar public behavior and is external. Internal pain cannot be known by anyone other than the self.

Knowing the meaning of pain is knowing how to use the word correctly. i.e. your pain is expressed in your behavior.

September 16, 2004 (Thursday):

Topics discussed in class today:

Physicalism-> No cartesian Minds
Identity Theory-> The mind really is nothing but the brain
Referents of Expression
"is" composition/"is" definition
Identity Theory



Physicalism-> No cartesian Minds. Consciousness is nothing more than a function of the brain.

1) Persuasive Redefinition (of what a mind is): The mind is whatever it is that causes our behavior.

2) Covert assumption about science: Science is the sole arbiter of what is real and what is not real.

3) Newly-Discovered Empirical Fact: Science has discovered (or will soon discover) that what in fact causes our behavior are complex states and processes of the central nervous system.

4) First Conclusion: What we have been calling "The Mind" really is nothing else than complex states and processes of the central nervous system. "The mind really is nothing but the brain."

5) Second Conclusion: If there is any role left for our ordinary ways of speaking about the mind and mental states and processes, it is not the role of stating truths about the way things really are.


Minds don't exist (so the story goes), so how can they be identical to brains, that do exist?

1) There is an entity refered to by the expression "X" and
2) There is an entity reffered to by the expression "Y".
3) It turns out that expression "X" and expression "Y"refer to one and the same thing. i.e. the Lois Lane analogy between Superman and Clark Kent (seen below)

Here "X" expressions are Psychological expressions about mental items and states and processes.
"Y" expressions are Physiological expressions about neurological items and states and processes.

Identity Theorists:

Identity Theorists claim that psychological talk does not refer to cartesian entities but to physiological entities.

Leibniz's Law of Identity:

Two items are identical if every property of one thing is also posessed by the other.

If "X has property P" is true
and "X" refers to the same thing that "Y" refers to
then "Y has property P" must also be true.

Used to argue against the identity theory

1) My mental states are known by introspection as states of my conscious self.
2) My brain states are not known by introspection as states of my conscious self.
Therefore, by Leibniz'z Law
3) The expression "my mental states," cannot refer to the same thing that "my brain states" refers to.

Intentioanl Fallacy:

1) Superman is widely known to be impervious to bullets.
2) Clark Kent is not widely known to be impervious to bullets.
3) "Superman" cannot refer to the same entity that "Clark Kent" refers to.
However,
4) "Superman" does refer to the same entity that "Clark Kent" refers to.
5) Therefore, this case must in some ways be an exception to Leibniz' Law.

We need to think seriously about what our words mean.

September 21, 2004 (Tuesday):

Topics discussed in class today:

Nomological Danglers
After Images-> "Report"? What do we observe? What does the observing?
Topic Neutral
Brainscans?
Is this a scientific hypothesis?



Nomological Danglers

Feigl says these are kinds of laws that would relate physical with the non-physical items.

After Images

i.e. The image one sees after staring into a bright light. There is no physical image, but yet the image is observable by the person.

Epiphenomenon

Above the phenomenon. Laws that apply to these phenomenon do not apply universally or not at all.

The way we learn words is by associating them with objects. i.e. look at that "red" shirt. We don't see the color red, but we associate the shirt as being red. Therefore, we are recalling experiences when looking at the red shirt.

It is only after we have learned to describe the things in our environment that we can learn to describe our consciousness of them.

For Descartes, there are 2 substances of the body. The Physical and the Mental (Non-Physical)

Topic Neutral

An analysis that is neutral between Dualism and Materialism

Brainscans

What goes on when I look at an Orange? Or, what goes on when I look at a red shirt? One way to find out is to take a Brainscan of the process as it happens.

Experiences are events that are happening.

What are we really imagining when we see or hear something in our minds? Are we actually seeing the color red or are we simply associating a red shirt with the color red? We are recalling a past experience and equating it to the color red. We just think we are visualizing the color red.

Would a brainscan tell you that you are seeing an orange shirt when you think you are seeing a red shirt?

A brainscan can only show the process, it can't interpret what experiences you are drawing upon to make your desicion. What if your version of red is actually different from the standard version of red? You can tell the machine what process makes up the color red and if you do not show the same process then the machine will say that you see a different color.

September 23, 2004 (Thursday):

Topics discussed in class today:

Richard Rorty: Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories
Identity Theorists (Place, Smart)
Eliminative Materialists (Rorty, Churchland)
Old and New Theories



Identity Theorists (Place, Smart)

Construct identity statements that have this form:

  1. There is an entity referred to by the expression "X"
  2. There is an entity referred to by the expression "Y"
  3. It turns out that expression "X" and expression "Y" refer to one and the same existent thing.

Eliminative Materialists (Rorty, Churchland)

Construct a quite different kind of argument:

  1. We thought we were referring to a distinct existent by the expression "X", but we were wrong. There never were any real X's with the properties that "X" expressions reserved for them.
  2. What there really are, are Y's, which are more accurately referred to by "Y" type expressions rather than the non misleading "X" type expressions.
  3. Accordingly, any "X" expressions left over in our vocabulary do not refer to the entities to which they seem to refer (namely X's). They refer to the only entities left to be referred to (namely Y's).

i.e. referring to the Sun rising and setting. The Sun doesn't actually rise or set, but we commonly refer to the day and the night as sunrise and sunset.

Old and New Theories

Old Theories New Theories
Unicorns Norwahl (whale horn)
Caloric Fluid Ek (molecules with kinetic energy)
Table Clouds of gas
Demon Posession Germs, viruses, and bacteria

Rorty's analysis of the 2 types of identity statement

Case I: (p.116)

Identification of observable entities with observable entities.
"Unicorn horns are nothing but narwahl horns (whale horn)."
"X" and "Y" refer to observable entities.
"This is an X" (this is a unicorn horn) commits one to an empirically false belief. There are no Unicorn horns.

Case II: (p.116)

Identification of observable with non-observable entities.
"The table is nothing but a cloud of molecules"
"X refers to observable entities "Y" does not.
"This is an X" (This is a table) does not commit one to an empirically false belief. The identity tells us something more about the situation reported.

Case III: (p.116)

"What people call sensations are nothing but brain processes."
This case is importantly different. hat does the truth of this identity statement tell us?
It is observable entities (we don't simply postulate the existense of (our own) sensations, nor of brain processes), so it is unlike Case II.

We are not tempted to conclude "there are no sensations" (I don't make an empirical mistake when I say "ouch! There's that paiun again.") So it is unlike Case I.

Two crucial conditions on replacing X theory with Y theory abd going from "X's are nothing but Y's" to "There are no X's":

  1. The Y reports (reporting exactly the way we speak) must be made non-inferentially or
  2. X reports are treated as reports of merely mental entities (hallucinates, perceptual, mistakes).

September 28, 2004 (Tuesday):

Topics discussed in class today:

Paul M. Churchland
Folk Psychology is a bad theory
Defects in Folk Psychology
Stagnation?
Advantages of Folk Psychology


"Classical Eliminativists (Rorty)

Conceptual analysis: Beliefs (say) are entities which have XYZ causal properties.
Empirical discovery: Nueroscience has shown (will show) that nothing has XYZ causal properties.
Therefore
- There exist no beliefs.

"New Wave" Eliminativists (Churchland)

Conceptual analysis: Folk psychology theorizes that beliefs have XYZ causal properties.
Empirical discovery: Nueroscience has shown (Will show) that nothing has XYZ causal properties.
Therefore
- Beliefs are not things that have XYZ causal properties.

The cause of my saying and the cause of my doing turn out to be two totally different things.

Vision for doing stuff is different than vision for reporting (telling) things. i.e. the ability to grab an object but not being able to report what that item is.

Memory for how to do things is quite different from the memory for facts.

Stagnation

Folk psychology has not changed in over 2000 years.

It doesn't integrate well into other sciences.

Advantages of Folk Psychology

A.I. (Artificial Intelligence) depends on Folk Psychology

Folk Psychology is really important for getting to the brain state in the first place.

Functionalists want to focus on the fact that there is a job being done by a brain not by the area of the brain that is processing the job.
i.e. Token identity and Type identity.
Token, your brain works differently than most brains.
Type, your brain works similar to most other brains.

Scientific accuracy: What's the point? Is it really better to be accurate or is it fine to just know something is wrong (F.P.) as opposed to knowing exactly what is wrong and reporting it?
i.e. My arm hurts, there are 6 C-Fibers firing in the 4th quadrant of my central cortex.
Folk Psychology is convenient and simple to understand.

Ethics = The ability to help people get along with each other. Not real, only S.C.R. (Socially Constructed Reality)

September 30, 2004 (Thursday):

Topics discussed in class today:

David M. Armstrong
Ryle (Behaviorist?)
Scientism (science worship?)
Defining the Mental
Functionalism
Consciousness


Scientism

"It is only as a result of scientific investigation that we ever seem to reach an intellectual consensus about controversial matters." (p.137,I)

If you want to know if something really exists, ask a scientist.

Science is good at proving P.B.R. (Physical and Biological Reality), not at S.C.R.

Defining the Mental

What's going on in the brain when we have an after-image of an object?

There is something going on that produces an after-image.

Psychological Behaviorism = There is only behavior. The mind is a substance within the world. How would a person would behave, have the dispoition to behave. -> Abilities and Dispositions

Philosophical Behaviorism = All there is is the body, there are no mental states.

It's not that anger is the behavior, to be angry is to have the disposition to being angry and anger is the criteria for a person to be angry.

"Our notion of a mind and of individual mental states is logically tied to behavior. For perhaps what we mean by a mental state is some state of the person that brings about a certain range of behavior." (p.139,II - p.140,I)

The mind could be considered the inner cause of certain behavior.

Behavior is evidence for a mind.

Functionalism

The mental state performs a job, does this function.

"Mental states are in fact nothing but physical states of the central nervoue system." (p.141,II)

Consciousness

Mental state that responds to the environment.

"...think of perceptions as inner states or events apt for the production of certain sorts of selective behavior towards our environment." (p.143,I)

A special process whose job it is to keep track of other brain processes.

October 05, 2004 (Tuesday):

October 05, 2004
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October 05, 2004
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October 05, 2004
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October 05, 2004
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October 07, 2004 (Thursday):

October 07, 2004
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October 12, 2004 (Tuesday):

October 12, 2004
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October 12, 2004
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October 12, 2004
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October 14, 2004 (Thursday):

October 14, 2004
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October 14, 2004
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October 21, 2004 (Thursday):

October 21, 2004
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October 21, 2004
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October 28, 2004 (Thursday):

October 28, 2004
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November 02, 2004 (Tuesday):

November 02, 2004
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November 04, 2004 (Thursday):

November 04, 2004
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November 09, 2004 (Tuesday):

November 09, 2004
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November 16, 2004 (Tuesday):

November 16, 2004
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November 18, 2004 (Thursday):

November 18, 2004
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November 18, 2004
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November 23, 2004 (Tuesday):

November 23, 2004
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November 30, 2004 (Tuesday):

November 30, 2004
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November 30, 2004
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November 30, 2004
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November 30, 2004
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November 30, 2004
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